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Abstract 
Rothbart and Park (1986) demonstrated that, consistent with the common negativity bias, 
positive traits are difficult to confirm and easy to disconfirm while the opposite is true for 
negative traits. We extend their analysis by showing that trait (dis-)confirmability is 
moderated by trait content (Warmth vs. Competence). Study 1 identifies a trait sample 
representative of Warmth and Competence. Study 2 shows a strong negativity effect for 
Warmth, and a reduced (or absent) negativity effect for Competence. Study 3 examines trait 
properties related to the behavioural range of the trait-possessor and to the motivational goals 
of the perceiver as predictors of trait (dis-) confirmability. The theoretical and practical 
implications of our findings are discussed and avenues for future research are suggested.   
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Judging other people’s personality traits is a common task people face in everyday life. Trait 
ascriptions help us to explain others’ behaviour, predict their future behaviour, and guide our 
own behaviour towards them. The rules by which people infer personality traits on the basis 
of observed behavioural instances have long been of interest to social psychologists (see 
Gilbert, 1998, for a review). Many authors have stressed the role of behaviour diagnosticity 
in this process. For example, Jones and Davis (1965) suggested in their classic correspondent 
inference theory that potentially costly behaviour that is at odds with situational demands or 
that violates social norms is particularly informative about some underlying stable quality of 
the actor and will thus lead to confident dispositional attributions. Socially desirable 
behaviour on the other hand is likely to be performed no matter whether an actor possesses 
the corresponding disposition or not (because it is socially rewarded), and is thus not very 
informative about the actor’s true disposition.  
While most work on trait attribution has focused on the inferential principles that 
guide causal reasoning, a number of studies have investigated the attributes inherent in trait 
concepts as determinants of how traits are diagnosed (e.g., Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Reeder 
& Brewer, 1979; Rothbart & Park, 1986). Reeder and Brewer (1979) proposed that the trait 
inference process may be affected by variations in the schematic representation of traits, in 
particular the implicational links between dispositional levels and relevant behaviours. They 
proposed that each position of a target person on a bipolar dispositional continuum is 
implicationally associated with a range of behaviours on the corresponding behavioural 
attribute continuum. Reeder and Brewer outlined three schemata of association (partially 
restrictive, hierarchically restrictive, and fully restrictive), each having different implications 
for the rules of inference used when making trait attributions based on observed behaviours.  
Perhaps most interesting is the hierarchically restrictive schema, which implies an 
asymmetrical association of dispositional levels and possible behaviours: Individuals at one 
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dispositional extreme are associated with a wider range of behaviours than are individuals at 
the other extreme. According to Reeder and Brewer (1979), this schema is likely to apply to 
ability attributes as well as moral attributes. For example, unintelligent individuals are 
expected to be capable of only unintelligent behaviour, whereas the behavioural range of 
intelligent people may be greater due to motivation and task demands and can therefore 
include both intelligent and unintelligent behaviour. Consequently, a single intelligent 
behaviour can lead to a confident attribution of the trait intelligent to an actor, but a single 
unintelligent behaviour is less diagnostic about the actor’s disposition (see Reeder, 1979, for 
empirical evidence). The hierarchically restrictive schema can be similarly applied to moral 
traits. For example, honest individuals are expected to engage almost exclusively in honest 
behaviours, whereas dishonest individuals could engage in both honest and dishonest 
behaviours. A single dishonest behaviour can thus be sufficient to lead us to attribute the trait 
dishonest to an actor, whereas a single honest behaviour is less informative (Reeder & 
Spores, 1983). 
Based in part on these ideas, Rothbart and Park (1986) investigated the 
‘confirmability’ (the ease with which a trait is instantiated) and ‘disconfirmability’ (the ease 
with which a trait ascription is revised) of trait concepts and demonstrated that different traits 
have different confirmation and disconfirmation thresholds. They showed that, as a general 
rule, ‘bad’ reputations are easy to gain and difficult to lose, whereas the opposite is true for 
‘good’ reputations. In this paper we revisit the issue of trait (dis-) confirmability. We argue 
that Rothbart and Park’s analysis can be further extended and refined by a systematic 
investigation of trait content, specifically by distinguishing between the two core dimensions 
of social perception, Warmth and Competence (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998a). Before outlining the present studies and our 
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predictions, we briefly review Rothbart and Park’s classic study and the relevant literature on 
Warmth and Competence as central dimensions of social perception. 
The Confirmability and Disconfirmability of Trait Concepts 
Rothbart and Park (1986) argued that personality traits differ on at least three relevant 
dimensions which may determine their diagnosis. First, Rothbart and Park suggested that the 
evidence-to-inference link is not identical for all traits (i.e., for some traits, a corresponding 
behaviour is more informative than for others). This dimension relates to the diagnosticity 
aspect of behavioural information discussed above (Jones & Davis, 1965; Reeder & Brewer, 
1979) and was operationalized by assessing the number of behavioural instances required to 
confirm a trait and the number of behavioural instances required to disconfirm it. 
Second, Rothbart and Park (1986) proposed that trait concepts vary in the degree to 
which they imply clear and specific behavioural referents. For example, it seems that 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory behaviours can be more clearly specified for traits such as 
friendly than for traits like sly. According to Rothbart and Park, traits may vary on this 
dimension due to their abstractness, their level of generality, or simply due to the number of 
clear behavioural exemplars accessible in memory. Third, Rothbart and Park (1986) 
suggested that the frequency with which occasions arise in everyday life that allow for 
confirming or disconfirming behaviour may vary between different types of traits. This 
dimension relates to the structural aspects of the social environment that determine the 
occurrence of different kinds of behaviour and thus the likelihood with which trait 
attributions can be made. For example, there are probably many more social occasions that 
allow for friendly behaviours than occasions that allow for heroic behaviours. 
Correspondingly, there are fewer occasions to engage in behaviour that disconfirms the trait 
heroic than occasions to engage in behaviour that disconfirms the trait friendly.  
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Treating traits as the unit of analysis, Rothbart and Park (1986) asked independent 
groups of judges to rate 150 personality traits on (1) the number of behavioural instances 
required to confirm a trait and the number of instances required to disconfirm it (Instances 
Confirming and Instances Disconfirming), (2) the ease of imagining confirming and 
disconfirming behaviours (Imaginability Confirming and Imaginability Disconfirming), and 
(3) the frequency of occasions that allow for the confirmation and disconfirmation of a trait 
(Occasions Confirming and Occasions Disconfirming). In addition, the traits were scaled 
according to their favourability as well as their perceived frequency in the general population.  
Rothbart and Park (1986) found an interesting pattern of intercorrelations between the 
different dimensions. They obtained positive correlations between the favourability of a trait 
and its judged population frequency, as well as the frequency of occasions that allow for 
confirming behaviours, reflecting the high frequency and thus low information value of 
positive events (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). There were also positive 
correlations between the occasions and imaginability dimensions, suggesting that frequently 
occurring traits tend to have clearer behavioural referents. Furthermore, while the occasions 
and imaginability dimensions showed symmetrical relationships (i.e., traits for which 
confirming behaviours can occur frequently/were easy to imagine also tended to be the traits 
for which disconfirming behaviours can occur frequently/were easy to imagine), a clear 
asymmetry was found for the instances dimensions. The negative correlation between the 
instances confirming and instances disconfirming ratings (r = -.71) suggests that traits which 
are easy to gain are harder to lose and vice versa.  
Moreover, whereas the instances confirming dimension correlated positively with 
favourability (r = .71), instances disconfirming correlated negatively with favourability (r = -
.70). This implies that unfavourable traits are easy to acquire and hard to lose, and that 
favourable traits are hard to acquire and easy to lose. This finding is consistent with the 
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common negativity bias, which is the greater impact of evaluatively negative than of equally 
intense positive stimuli (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenhauer, & Vohs, 2001, for a 
review). This bias has been explained in a number of ways. While some accounts expect 
negativity biases due to the asymmetrical diagnosticity of positive and negative behaviours 
(e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965), others (range-frequency explanations, see Kanouse & Hanson, 
1972) have stressed that negative events impact more heavily on impressions because they 
are in greater contrast when compared to the slightly positive (but psychologically neutral) 
point of expectation, and thus appear more extreme and novel than positive events.  
Studies that have disentangled frequency from negativity (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991) 
suggest, however, that there may be an automatic vigilance mechanism which monitors 
potentially threatening information, resulting in biased attention to and memory for negative 
information. Peeters (1983) gave a functional account of this mechanism in his ‘behavioural-
adaptive theory’. He suggested that evolutionary pressures underlie both the common general 
positive orientation (i.e., the Pollyanna principle; Matlin & Stang, 1978) and the negativity 
bias. The general tendency to expect positive outcomes results in the approaching of novel 
objects and situations and is functional as it expands the range of beneficial dealings with the 
environment. However, as uncontrolled approach behaviour would sooner or later have 
harmful effects, it is coupled with a strong sensitivity to aversive stimuli and overemphasis of 
the negative. This is connected to a straightforward avoidance reaction, which serves to avert 
danger quickly (see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990, for a review of evidence).  
The Content of Social Perception: Warmth and Competence 
The social perception literature suggests that when people interact with others they are 
mainly interested in finding out (a) what others’ goals are in relation to their goals (i.e., 
others’ intent toward them, e.g., whether they are trustworthy, tolerant, deceitful, or 
aggressive) and (b) whether they are capable of realizing those goals (e.g., whether they are 
                                                      The Disconfirmability of Warmth and Competence   
       - 8 -
intelligent, ambitious, stupid, or lazy). Fiske et al. (2002) have labelled these dimensions 
Warmth and Competence, respectively. 
The two dimensions were first established in research on implicit personality theories 
which, using multidimensional scaling, obtained the dimension of social desirability, which 
encompassed traits like honest, helpful, and sincere at one end and dishonest, selfish and 
irresponsible at the other, and the dimension intellectual desirability, which contained traits 
such as intelligent, persistent, and skilful at one end, and foolish, unintelligent, and clumsy at 
the other (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekanathan, 1968). Similarly, Peeters (1983) proposed 
that traits group along two dimensions: that of self-profitability, which pertains to 
Competence and is related to the adaptive value of attributes for the self, and other-
profitability, which pertains to Warmth and is related to the adaptive value of attributes for 
others. He thus distinguished four groups of traits: (1) positive self-profitable traits, which 
have maximum positive outcomes for the trait-possessor, such as confident or  intelligent; (2) 
negative self-profitable traits, which are generally disadvantageous for the trait-possessor, for 
example, slow or unintelligent; (3) positive other-profitable traits, which have a beneficial 
effect on other people surrounding the trait possessor, such as trustworthy and tolerant; and 
(4) negative other-profitable traits, which have a harmful effect on other people surrounding 
the trait possessor, for example selfish and intolerant.  
Wojciszke and colleagues (see Wojciszke, 2005, for a review) demonstrated in a 
series of studies that Warmth and Competence are two basic kinds of content used when 
construing actions, evaluating others, and perceiving the self. Furthermore, consistent with 
Peeters’ proposition, Wojciszke, Dowhyluk, and Jaworski (1998b) showed that Warmth-
related traits are generally perceived as being more other- than self-profitable and that 
Competence-related traits are perceived as being more self- than other-profitable. Warmth 
and Competence are also central components of group stereotypes. For example, Phalet and 
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Poppe (1997) found that Warmth (honest, tolerant, modest, aggressive, selfish, and rude) and 
Competence (efficient, competitive, self-confident, intelligent, slow, and clumsy) emerged as 
distinct dimensions of group stereotypes (see also Fiske et al., 2002).  
A number of accounts specifically predict differences between Warmth and 
Competence in terms of the rules by which traits are ascribed. Based on Peeters’ (1983) 
behavioural-adaptive approach, Peeters and Czapinski (1990) proposed that, since other 
people’s self-profitable (i.e., Competence-related) qualities are only consequential to the 
extent that they lead to higher or lower efficiency in inflicting harm or furnishing benefits, 
only the other-profitable (i.e., Warmth) dimension is unequivocally associated with approach 
and avoidance. Thus, they proposed that the negativity bias is expected primarily for this 
dimension and not the self-profitable dimension. The cue-diagnosticity model of impression 
formation (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), however, expects opposite patterns of information 
integration for Warmth and Competence, due to differences in the diagnosticity of positive 
and negative behaviours for these two dimensions. Skowronski and Carlston proposed that a 
trait judgement can be compared to a category decision task where behaviours serve as cues 
and traits as categories. Behaviours that are frequently and almost exclusively associated with 
members of one category are highly diagnostic of category membership and should lead to 
confident trait ascriptions. Note that the implications of this model are similar to those of 
Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) schematic model of dispositional attribution.   
The cue-diagnosticity model can account for the negativity bias in trait ascription, but 
also explicitly predicts a positivity bias for traits related to ability, for which positive cues 
may be regarded as more diagnostic than negative ones, as success is generally perceived as 
evidence that the actor has the ability to perform the task, whereas failure is more ambiguous 
and may be due to causes other than ability, such as motivational and situational factors. This 
positivity bias has been reported in a number of studies.  For example, Skowronski and 
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Carlston (1987, 1992) showed that intelligent behaviours were seen as more useful when 
making intelligence judgments than were unintelligent behaviours, demonstrating a positivity 
bias.  
The Present Research 
We present three studies in this paper. Study 1 was conducted to identify trait adjectives that 
broadly represent the Warmth and Competence domains. Study 2 examined the obtained trait 
sample along the original eight dimensions investigated by Rothbart and Park (1986) and 
aimed to extend their research by testing for the moderating role of trait content on trait 
confirmability and disconfirmability. Two of Rothbart and Park’s dimensions, the number of 
instances required to confirm a trait and the number of instances required to disconfirm a 
trait, were of primary importance to this research. An important finding of Rothbart and 
Park’s study was that positive trait ascriptions are hard to gain and easy to lose whereas the 
opposite is true for negative trait ascriptions. Rothbart and Park did not systematically 
investigate whether these findings apply equally to different types of traits. They noted, 
however, that traits relating to ability (e.g., musical, scientifically-minded, intelligent, wise) 
did not exhibit the general pattern of many-instances-to-confirm/few-instances-to-disconfirm 
found for positive traits. These traits needed relatively fewer instances to be confirmed and 
one trait (musical) even exhibited the opposite pattern of few-instances-to-confirm/many-
instances-to-disconfirm. Nonetheless, Rothbart and Park concluded that “the overwhelming 
negativity of the majority of traits in this cell seems to argue for the relative importance of 
favorability as a determinant of dispositional inference” (p. 138). Study 2 sought to clarify 
whether trait favourability is a sufficient predictor of trait disconfirmability, or whether trait 
content, specifically Warmth vs. Competence, does matter.  
In Study 3, we added five additional dimensions to the analysis to gain further 
insights into the cognitive and motivational factors underlying the (dis-) confirmability of 
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Warmth and Competence: (1) the difficulty of pretending to have a trait, (2) the difficulty of 
hiding a trait, (3) the likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviour, (4) the potential harmfulness 
of incorrect trait ascriptions, and (5) the self-desirability of traits. We tested a number of 
hypotheses concerning differences between Warmth and Competence on these dimensions 
and assessed the extent to which these factors relate to trait (dis-) confirmability.  
Study 1: Identifying a Trait Sample Representative of Warmth and Competence 
Positive and negative trait adjectives related to Warmth and Competence were drawn from a 
pool of items from the person perception and stereotyping literature. To ensure that the trait 
words chosen for the current research did indeed represent the Warmth and Competence 
categories, 26 judges were asked to place each trait in either category.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 26 (10 male, 14 female, 2 did not specify their gender; mean age = 
23 years) students at a British university.  
Materials and Procedure  
The initial pool of traits included all 150 items from Rothbart and Park’s (1986) study 
and the additional trait words from Anderson’s (1968) study on the likeableness of traits. It 
was further supplemented by traits used in a number of stereotyping studies (e.g., Fiske et al., 
2002; Phalet & Poppe, 1997) as well as Rosenberg and Sedlack’s (1972) study on implicit 
personality theories. Adjectives that do not occur in British English (e.g., unentertaining, 
unagreeable), adjectives that do not represent durable characteristics (e.g., excited, angry), as 
well as words that are not adjectives (e.g., worrier, liar) were not included. The generated 
pool of traits contained 641 trait adjectives.  
Two independent judges classified these traits into trait words that represent Warmth, 
Competence, or neither of the two categories. They agreed on 85.9% of these ratings. One 
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hundred and fifty-three traits were placed by both judges into the Warmth category and 127 
traits were consistently placed into the Competence category. These traits were then further 
rated on their valence (positive vs. negative). The same two judges reached 100% agreement 
on these ratings. Of the 153 traits related to Warmth, 60 were rated as positive and 93 as 
negative. Of the 127 Competence-related traits, 71 were rated as positive and 56 as negative. 
Next, we examined the frequency of these trait words in British English. The word 
frequencies were obtained from Kelk (2003) and ranged from 0 for words that are used very 
infrequently in British English to 16 for words that are used very frequently. Our aim was to 
choose approximately equal numbers of positive and negative traits in each category, and to 
have roughly equal average word frequencies in each category. The reason for matching 
frequency was to rule out the possibility that obtained differences between the content 
categories on the examined dimensions were due to differential lexical accessibility of the 
adjectives across the Warmth and Competence dimensions.  
First, we deleted all highly uncommon words (word frequency = 0) from the list. 
Second, highly redundant trait words as well as highly common words which can have 
additional meanings (e.g., just, cold) were excluded. The obtained trait list consisted of 30 
positive and 33 negative traits related to Warmth, and 30 positive and 32 negative traits 
related to Competence. Next, the list of 125 trait words was presented to 26 judges, who were 
asked to sort each trait word into either of the two content categories. The traits appeared in a 
different random order for each judge. Before making their judgments, judges were provided 
with a definition of the categories Warmth and Competence. Warmth was defined as 
representing people’s compatibility with other people (whether they are well- or ill-
intentioned; beneficial or harmful) and Competence was defined as representing people’s 
ability and capability to complete tasks and achieve status-related goals.  
Results and Discussion 
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The assignment of traits was highly consistent between the 26 judges (mean 
agreement rate = 91%). For a number of traits, however, the agreement rate was substantially 
lower. To ensure that traits used in the analyses in Studies 2 and 3 were representative for 
either Warmth or Competence, we excluded all traits (N = 31) for which the agreement rate 
among judges was below 85%, leaving a sample of 94 traits, 52 of which were related to 
Warmth and 42 of which were related to Competence. Overall, the final trait list represented 
the two content categories well and contained the key constructs related to Warmth (e.g., 
trustworthy, tolerant, aggressive, selfish) and Competence (e.g., intelligent, efficient, slow, 
incompetent) used in previous work (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; Peeters, 1983). A 2 (valence: 
positive vs. negative) x 2 (content: Warmth vs. Competence) ANOVA on word frequencies 
yielded no significant effects (all F’s <1), confirming that there were no differences in the 
average word frequency between the categories of trait words in the final trait list. 
Study 2: Trait (Dis-) Confirmability and the Moderating Role of Trait Content  
Having identified traits representative of the two content categories, we tested the following 
hypotheses: Consistent with both the behavioural-adaptive perspective (Peeters & Czapinski, 
1990) and the diagnosticity approach (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987), we expected to replicate Rothbart and Park’s finding that positive traits need many 
instances to be confirmed and few to be disconfirmed, and that negative traits require few 
instances to be confirmed and many to be disconfirmed for the Warmth domain. The 
behavioural-adaptive perspective predicts this negativity bias because others’ Warmth-related 
traits have direct consequences for the observer; the behaviour diagnosticity approach expects 
this negativity bias because of the high diagnosticity of negative behaviours in this domain.  
In the Competence domain, however, no such negativity effect is expected.  Peeters 
and Czapinski (1990) proposed that positive-negative asymmetry phenomena involve 
primarily the other-profitable dimension (i.e., Warmth) and not the self-profitable dimension 
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(i.e., Competence), which is more ambiguously related to approach and avoidance. Thus, 
these authors predict no negativity bias for Competence ascriptions. However, the 
diagnosticity approach predicts a positivity effect in the Competence domain because 
behaviours corresponding to high ability are restricted to people who actually possess that 
ability (and are thus diagnostic of an actor’s disposition), whereas behaviours indicating low 
ability are not (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Thus, positive traits 
should need fewer instances to be confirmed than do negative traits, and negative traits 
should require fewer instances to be disconfirmed than do positive traits in the Competence 
domain. No explicit predictions on Warmth-Competence differences on the other dimensions 
were tested. We assessed these dimensions in order to replicate Rothbart and Park’s (1986) 
results as well as for control purposes. Further extending Rothbart and Park’s analysis, this 
study examined the dimensions’ relations to word frequency.  
Method 
Overview 
The procedure for obtaining judgments of trait properties closely followed that of 
Rothbart and Park (1986). Independent groups of participants rated the trait adjectives 
obtained in Study 1 on the 8 dimensions assessed in Rothbart and Park’s original study. Each 
participant rated all traits (94 target traits and ten practice traits) on one dimension only.  
Design  
Traits, not people, were the unit of analysis. We used a 2 (trait valence: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (trait content: Warmth vs. Competence) between-subjects (i.e., traits) design.  
Participants 
Participants were 81 (27 male, 51 female, 3 did not specify their gender; mean age = 
20 years) students at a British university. Each dimension was rated by 9 to 11 participants.  
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Procedure and Measures 
Participants provided their ratings individually. Each participant was randomly assigned 
to one of the eight judgment tasks – he or she was given the next questionnaire off the top of 
a randomly mixed stack. Participants were asked to read the detailed instructions printed on 
each questionnaire very carefully before starting the rating task. The instructions were based 
as closely as possible on those used by Rothbart and Park (1986). Traits were presented in a 
different random order for each judge within a given dimension, with the 10 practice items 
always appearing first. Participants typically completed the task in about 15-20 minutes. 
Upon completion, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Reliability 
The first 10 practice items were deleted before the analyses. To determine whether 
participants were able to make reliable judgments on the dimensions, we followed Rothbart 
and Park’s (1986) practice and calculated the correlation between each participant’s ratings 
and the average ratings by all other participants within that dimension. Participants whose 
judgments correlated near zero (less than .10) with the average score were excluded. This 
procedure led to the exclusion of 2 unreliable judges. We then assessed the degree to which 
the remaining judges agreed, using Cronbach’s α. Although this procedure usually examines 
the degree of interrelatedness among i items over j judges, we reversed items and judges and 
assessed the degree of agreement among judges over 94 items. The numbers of original and 
final judges for each dimension along with coefficient alpha values before and after deletion 
of unreliable judges appear in Table 1. The final alphas ranged from .66 to .98, with a median 
of .79, and are similar to those obtained by Rothbart and Park.  
Differences between Warmth and Competence on the Dimensions 
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Using all reliable judges, we computed average scores for each trait on each 
dimension. Table 2 presents mean ratings for positive and negative Warmth and positive and 
negative Competence. Results of a series of 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (content: 
Warmth vs. Competence) ANOVAs for each dimension are reported below.  
Favourability. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 
1345.34, p < .001, such that people possessing positive traits were rated more favourably (M 
= 7.15, SD = .70) than people possessing negative traits (M = 2.99, SD = 1.11), and a main 
effect of content, F(1, 90) = 14.44, p < .001, with Competence-related traits rated more 
favourably (M = 5.48, SD = 1.42) than Warmth-related traits (M = 4.86, SD = 2.90). These 
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between valence and content, F(1, 90) 
= 161.78, p < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that positive Warmth-related traits were rated 
more favourably (M = 7.66) than were positive Competence-related traits (M = 6.65), F(1, 
48) = 54.75, p < .001, and that negative Warmth-related traits were rated more negatively (M 
= 2.02) than were negative Competence-related traits (M = 3.93), F(1, 42) = 101.86, p < .001. 
Overall, these results suggest that the Warmth dimension is more polarized in terms of 
favourability ratings. This finding is consistent with the behavioural adaptive approach 
(Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) and replicates previous research which suggested that the 
Warmth-dimension is more saturated with affect than the Competence dimension (Wojciszke 
et al., 1998b), due to its greater relevance for approach-avoidance.  
Instances Confirming. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 
90) = 161.76, p < .001, such that, consistent with previous findings (Rothbart & Park, 1986), 
positive traits required more instances of confirming behaviours (M = 5.54, SD =.87) to be 
established than did negative traits (M = 3.36, SD =.92). There was also a significant main 
effect of trait content, F(1, 90) = 5.12, p = .026; overall, Warmth-related traits required fewer 
instances of confirming behaviours (M = 4.32, SD = 1.71) to be established than did 
                                                      The Disconfirmability of Warmth and Competence   
       - 17 -
Competence-related traits (M = 4.77, SD =.87). These results were qualified by a significant 
interaction between valence and content, F(1, 90) = 27.65, p < .001. Positive Warmth-related 
traits required more instances to be confirmed (M = 5.78) than did positive Competence-
related traits (M = 5.29), F(1, 48) = 4.17, p = .047, and negative Warmth-related traits 
required fewer instances to be confirmed (M = 2.87) than did negative Competence-related 
traits (M = 4.08),  F(1, 42) = 32.54, p < .001. Thus, the difference between positive and 
negative traits on the instances confirming dimension was more pronounced for Warmth than 
for Competence. However, positive traits required more instances to be confirmed than 
negative traits within each content category, F(1, 50) = 143.85, p < .001 and F(1,40) = 37.73, 
p < .001, respectively. These findings indicate a negativity effect for both Warmth and 
Competence, which was, however, less pronounced in the Competence domain. These results 
are not consistent with a positivity effect for Competence (i.e., more instances required to 
confirm negative than positive traits). 
Because differences between positive and negative traits in global favourability were 
more pronounced for Warmth than for Competence, and because favourability is a major 
predictor of instances ratings (Rothbart & Park, 1986), the valence x content interaction could 
be due to differences in favourability. To investigate this possibility, we repeated the analysis 
adding trait favourability as a covariate. When favourability was controlled for, the valence x 
content interaction ceased to be significant, F(1, 89) = 2.08, p = .152. Positive Warmth and 
positive Competence did not differ in terms of instances confirming (adjusted M = 4.96 and 
4.80, respectively), F(1, 89) <1, but the difference between negative Warmth and negative 
Competence remained significant (adjusted M = 3.87 and 4.48), F(1,89) = 4.98, p = .031.  
  Instances Disconfirming.  We obtained a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 
68.16, p < .001, with positive traits requiring fewer instances to be disconfirmed (M = 4.47, 
SD =.98) than negative traits (M = 5.83, SD =.79), in line with the notion that negative traits 
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are harder to ‘lose’ than positive traits (Rothbart & Park, 1986). This main effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction between valence and content, F(1, 90) = 40.19, p < .001. 
Simple effects analyses revealed that positive Warmth-related traits required fewer instances 
to be disconfirmed (M = 3.87) than did positive Competence-related traits (M = 5.12), F(1, 
48) = 34.08, p < .001, and that negative Warmth-related traits required more instances to be 
disconfirmed (M = 6.11) than did negative Competence-related traits (M = 5.41), F(1, 42) = 
10.22, p = .003. Moreover, while the difference between positive and negative traits on the 
instances disconfirming dimension was significant for Warmth-related traits, F(1, 50) = 
110.03, p < .001, it was not significant for Competence-related traits, F(1, 40) = 1.87, p = 
.173, indicating a negativity effect for Warmth and the absence of a negativity effect (but no 
positivity effect) for Competence. 
We also repeated the analysis with favourability partialled out. The significant 
valence x content interaction re-emerged in the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), F(1, 89) 
= 12.66, p = .001. Simple effects tests controlling for trait favourability revealed a significant 
main effect of content for positive traits, F(1, 47) = 15.18, p < .001, such that positive 
Warmth-related traits required fewer instances to be disconfirmed (adjusted M = 3.97) than 
did positive Competence-related traits (adjusted M = 5.17). There was no significant 
difference between Warmth (adjusted M = 5.99) and Competence (adjusted M = 5.37) for 
negative traits when differences in favourability were controlled for.  
Imaginability, Occasions, and Population Frequency. The same 2 x 2 ANOVA was 
run on the additional dimensions in order to explore differences between Warmth and 
Competence. As we had no specific hypotheses about Warmth-Competence differences on 
these dimensions, we adjusted the accepted significance level to p < .01. Only one significant 
result emerged: There was a significant main effect of valence for the population frequency 
dimension, F(1, 90) = 32.26, p < .001. In line with previous findings (Rothbart & Park, 
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1986), the occurrence of positive traits in the general population was rated as more frequent 
(M = 5.49, SD = .69) than the occurrence of negative traits (M = 4.65, SD = .76).  
Intercorrelations of Dimensions 
Next, we examined the intercorrelations among the dimensions, which are shown in 
Table 3. Because many of the variables share a substantial amount of variance with overall 
trait favourability, which is likely to result in spurious intercorrelations, we present both zero-
order correlations as well as correlations with favourability partialled out.  
Intercorrelations across all traits. Overall, the obtained correlations among the 
dimensions were, with a few exceptions, in line with the main findings reported by Rothbart 
and Park (1986). Consistent with the negativity bias, favourability was highly positively 
correlated with the instances confirming dimension (r = .84) and highly negatively correlated 
with the instances disconfirming dimension (r = -.69). Trait favourability was also highly 
correlated with its judged frequency in the population (r = .55), which is consistent with the 
Pollyanna Principle (Matlin & Stang, 1978) and the high frequency of positive events in 
general (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). Moreover, consistent with previous results was the 
asymmetrical relation between the instances confirming and instances disconfirming 
dimensions (r = -.69), which remained significant when favourability was partialled out (r = -
.30), and the symmetrical relationship for both the imaginability (r = .47) and occasions (r = 
.62) dimensions, which themselves were significantly correlated with each other (from r = 
.41 to r = .54). We examined one additional dimension in the current study, the word 
frequency in British English. This variable was significantly correlated with imaginability 
confirming and marginally significantly correlated with imaginability disconfirming (r = .29 
and r = .18), suggesting that behavioural referents for trait words that are frequently used are 
more easy to imagine. 
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Differences between Warmth and Competence. Correlations between favourability 
and the instances dimensions calculated separately for Warmth and Competence are shown in 
Table 4. We tested whether correlations differed significantly between the two content 
categories using Fisher’s Z-test for bivariate correlations (performed online; Preacher, 2005). 
The correlation between favourability and instances confirming was positive for both 
Warmth (r = .88) and Competence (r = .65), but significantly lower for Competence, z = 
2.80, p = .005. The correlation between favourability and instances disconfirming was 
negative for both Warmth (r = -.84) and Competence (r = -.12), but significantly lower,  z = 
5.13, p < .001, and insignificant, for Competence. We also examined whether the 
asymmetrical relationship between instances confirming and instances disconfirming applies 
equally to Warmth and Competence. There was a strong negative correlation between 
instances confirming and instances disconfirming for Warmth (r = -.84) and a significantly 
reduced and insignificant negative correlation for Competence (r = -.17), z = -4.89, p < .001. 
The difference in correlations is similar when favourability is partialled out (partial r = -.42 
for Warmth, and partial r = -.12 for Competence) and the difference between partial 
correlations was significant, t(89) = 3.38, p = .001, when tested using a standard moderation 
test (Baron & Kenny, 1986).   
Overall, the results of Study 2 indicate that the negativity bias applies primarily to the 
ascription of Warmth. For Competence, a reduced (for instances confirming) or absent (for 
instances disconfirming) negativity effect emerged. Thus, we can conclude that trait content 
does matter. The fact that no positivity effect was obtained for Competence could be due to a 
number of differences in methodology between the present research and previous research on 
the role of behaviour diagnosticity in trait ascription. Whereas Rothbart and Park’s (1986) 
method assesses participant’s beliefs about how they typically judge traits, in the studies 
conducted by Skowronski and Carlston (1987, 1992) and Reeder and colleagues (e.g., 
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Reeder, 1979; Reeder & Spores, 1983) participants were presented with actual behaviours 
and the impact of those behaviours on actual trait ratings was assessed. Rothbart and Park’s 
method quite possibly leads people to think about moderate behaviours that they typically 
encounter in everyday life (and that are therefore salient in memory); the positivity effect, 
however, is most evident when extreme behavioural information is presented (see 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).   
 Furthermore, Reeder and Brewer (1979) suggested that, within a specific situational 
context, the structure of trait-behaviour implications may be altered, such that the strength of 
some implicational links is enhanced and that of others reduced or eliminated. For example, 
when there are situational demands for competent behaviour, as is often the case, perceivers 
expect that most persons (regardless of their level of competence) will try to perform 
competently, so behaviours demonstrating both high and low competence may be seen as 
informative about a target’s competence (see Reeder, Henderson, & Sullivan, 1982). In such 
a situation, relatively few instances of behaviour would be required to confirm incompetence, 
and a positivity effect is likely to emerge only for very high levels of competence. To explore 
this issue further, we assessed the likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviour in Study 3. 
The effect of personal involvement on trait judgments may further help to explain the 
present findings. Participants in the present study were probably thinking about common 
situations in their life involving people they usually interact with and whose actions could 
affect them. Skowronski and Carlston (1992) showed that, as personal involvement in a trait 
ascription task increases, trait judgments are less influenced by behaviour diagnosticity, and 
the positivity bias in judgments of intelligence is reduced. According to Neuberg and Fiske 
(1987), the presence of motivational goals could lead to enhanced weighting of negative 
information in impression formation. In Study 3 we explore whether trait attributes related to 
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motivational factors, specifically self-protection from harm and self-enhancement, could lead 
to bias in the confirmation of negative traits and the disconfirmation of positive traits.  
Study 3: Aspects of Behaviour Diagnosticity, the Potential Harmfulness of Incorrect 
Trait Ascriptions, and Self-Desirability as Predictors of Trait (Dis-)confirmability 
In this study we scaled our trait sample on five additional dimensions in order to further 
illuminate differences between Warmth and Competence and to explore the extent to which a 
number of different factors, related to the behavioural range of the trait possessor and the 
motivational goals of the perceiver, may underlie trait (dis-) confirmability.  
First, we examined whether traits related to Warmth and Competence differ in terms 
of perceived behavioural range. To do this, we scaled traits on the perceived likelihood of 
trait-inconsistent behaviours, which is related to the diagnosticity of trait-related behaviours. 
As trait-behaviour implications are likely to be asymmetric in the domains of Warmth and 
Competence (Reeder & Brewer, 1979), we predicted that inconsistent behaviours would be 
judged to be more likely for positive Competence than for negative Competence, and more 
likely for negative Warmth-related traits compared to positive Warmth-related traits. 
Furthermore, since behaviours that are frequently and almost exclusively associated with 
members of one trait category are highly diagnostic (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), this 
dimension should be related to the instances disconfirming dimension, such that more 
behavioural instances should be required to disconfirm a trait when inconsistent behaviours 
are common for that trait. This dimension is not directly related to the instances confirming 
dimension, but due to the asymmetry of the instances dimension (Rothbart & Park, 1986) and 
the hierarchical structure of trait-behaviour implications in the Warmth and Competence 
domains (Reeder & Brewer, 1979), a negative correlation can be expected. 
We also tested whether different factors predict the perceived behavioural range of 
traits related to Warmth and Competence. Reeder (1993) proposed that whereas social 
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desirability issues as described by Jones and Davis (1965) are probably at least partly 
responsible for the asymmetrical diagnosticity of positive and negative behaviours in the 
Warmth domain, perceptions of performance limitations underlie the inference of 
Competence. People of low ability lack the power to bring about a high-level of performance 
whereas people of high ability can exhibit both low- and high ability performances. These 
differences in power, or controllability, should lead to the asymmetric trait-behaviour 
implications described by Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) hierarchically restrictive schema. In 
this study we measured both the difficulty of pretending to have a trait as well as the 
difficulty of hiding a trait in order to assess the controllability aspect. We expected an 
interaction of trait valence with trait content for both these dimensions, such that positive and 
negative traits differ on these dimensions for Competence, but not for Warmth. It should be 
easy to pretend that one has negative Competence-related traits (e.g., it is easy to pretend that 
one is stupid or clumsy) but difficult to hide, whereas the opposite should apply to positive-
Competence related traits. Moreover, we tested Reeder’s proposition that controllability 
attributes affect behaviour diagnosticity ratings (which we operationalized as the likelihood 
of trait-inconsistent behaviour) only in the Competence domain. 
Reeder (1993) also proposed that adaptive concerns (see also Peeters & Czapinski, 
1990) could further underlie judgments of a person’s Warmth. People form impressions of 
other people with the goal of predicting others’ future behaviour and guiding their own 
behaviour towards others (e.g., avoiding or approaching them). Thus, a motive to protect 
oneself from people who lie, cheat, or behave aggressively could lead people to be 
conservative in trait ascriptions. Although it is not possible to address motivational factors 
directly with Rothbart and Park’s (1986) methodology, scaling traits on attributes that may be 
relevant for motives can give some insight into the roles that they may play. To do this, we 
asked participants to judge traits according to how harmful they thought it could be to them 
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personally if they ascribed the given trait incorrectly to someone. We expected that incorrect 
trait ascriptions would be more harmful for positive than for negative traits. Generally, 
assigning a ‘bad’ person to a ‘good’ category (and then approaching them) carries greater risk 
and should be avoided more persistently than assigning a ‘good’ person to a ‘bad’ category 
(and then avoiding them). For example, erroneously believing that someone is trustworthy 
and then disclosing confidential information to them could have serious consequences, 
whereas erroneously believing that someone is untrustworthy and therefore not disclosing 
confidential information could not. Trait ascription could therefore be seen as a form of risk-
taking, where costs typically have a greater deterrence value than gains have an attraction 
value (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1984). If the potential harmfulness of an incorrect trait 
ascription influences trait ascriptions, then this dimension should be correlated positively 
with the instances confirming, and negatively with the instances disconfirming dimension. 
Moreover, we suggest that incorrect trait ascription could be harmful in both the 
Warmth- and the Competence domains, as both types of trait ascriptions could guide our 
behaviour towards others. However, in line with Peeters and Czapinski’s (1990) ideas, we 
expected that an erroneous inference of positive Warmth-related traits has greater potential 
for harm than an erroneous inference of positive Competence-related traits. Other people’s 
Warmth has a direct effect on the observer, whereas other people’s Competence is more 
ambiguously related to consequences for the perceiver and depends more on special 
circumstances (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Wojciszke et al., 1998b).  
The present study also sought to investigate the possibility that self-serving biases 
play a role in trait (dis-)confirmability. Festinger (1954) proposed that people have a drive to 
evaluate themselves on important dimensions and often do so by comparing themselves to 
relevant others. Subsequent research revealed that this comparison process is anything but 
unbiased; it is subject to a number of motives, of which self-enhancement, that is attaining or 
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maintaining positive self-esteem, is the strongest (Sedikides, 1993). People use a variety of 
strategies in order to arrive at favourable views of themselves. These include self-serving 
attributions about their own behaviour, but also biased judgments of others which then 
indirectly enhance their own self-images (see Dunning, 2001, for a review). We believe that 
one possible strategy to ensure favourable social comparisons is to apply very stringent 
criteria for inferring that other people possess desirable traits (i.e., others have to engage in 
many trait-confirming behaviours to be ascribed a desirable trait and few behaviours to be 
ascribed an undesirable trait; and to engage in few trait-disconfirming behaviours before the 
perceiver decides that they do not possess a desirable trait and many trait-disconfirming 
behaviours before the perceiver decides that they do not possess an undesirable trait).  
If this strategy serves self-enhancement motives, it should be especially pronounced 
for traits that are important to one’s self-concept and self-esteem. Given that self-esteem is an 
indicator of the extent to which someone meets cultural standards (Tesser, 2001) it is likely 
that both one’s Warmth and one’s Competence are important for one’s self-esteem. Warmth 
is important because being able to maintain good relationships with others ensures social 
approval and inclusion, and satisfies the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Competence, on the other hand, is important to self-evaluation because it is directly related to 
the ability to achieve goals and succeed in life (Peeters, 1983; Wojciszke et al., 1998b).  
However, in a direct test of the relative importance of Warmth and Competence for 
the self-concept, Wojciszke et al. (1998b) revealed that Competence dominates the self-
concept, is seen as more desirable for the self than Warmth, and has a greater impact on 
people’s self-esteem than does Warmth (see Phalet & Poppe, 1997, for analogous findings for 
in-group vs. out-group stereotypes). Thus, the self-enhancement motive may be particularly 
important when judging others’ Competence. In this study, we scaled traits on the extent to 
which they are seen as desirable for the self. We expected positive traits to be generally more 
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desirable than negative traits and, in line with Wojciszke et al. (1998b), that this difference 
would be more pronounced for Competence than for Warmth. Moreover, if self-enhancement 
motives play a role in the inference of other people’s traits, we expected self-desirability 
ratings of traits to correlate positively with instances confirming ratings and negatively with 
instances disconfirming ratings.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 53 (9 male, 42 female, 2 did not specify their gender; mean age = 22 
years) students at a British university. Each dimension was rated by 10 to12 participants.  
Procedure and Measures 
The procedure was essentially the same as that of Study 2. Participants rated how 
difficult it is for someone to pretend to have the given trait if they do not actually possess it 
(Difficulty Pretending), how difficult it is for someone to pretend not to have the given trait if 
they actually do (Difficulty Hiding), how likely it is that someone who possesses the given 
trait shows trait-inconsistent behaviours (Diagnosticity), how harmful it could be to 
incorrectly ascribe the given trait (Potential Harm), or how desirable it would be to score 
high on this trait compared to other people (Self-desirability). Each participant rated all traits 
on one dimension only.  
Results and Discussion 
Reliability 
The analyses closely resembled those of Study 2. Three unreliable judges were 
excluded. The numbers of original and final judges for each dimension along with coefficient 
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alpha values before and after deletion of unreliable judges appear in Table 5. The reliabilities 
were generally satisfactory, with final alphas ranging from .62 to .98.  
Differences between Warmth and Competence on the Dimensions  
Using all reliable judges, we computed average scores for each trait on each of the 
five dimensions. Table 6 presents mean ratings and standard deviations for positive and 
negative Warmth and positive and negative Competence. Results of a series of 2 (valence: 
positive vs. negative) x 2 (content: Warmth vs. Competence) ANOVAs on mean ratings for 
each dimension are reported below. 
Difficulty Pretending. There was a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 
39.12, p < .001, such that pretending to have positive traits was rated as being more difficult 
(M = 4.86, SD = 1.15) than pretending to have negative traits (M = 3.75, SD = .97). This 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between valence and content, F(1, 90) = 
30.17, p < .001. While participants rated pretending to have positive Competence-related 
traits as more difficult (M = 5.59) than pretending to have positive Warmth-related traits (M = 
4.18), F(1, 48) = 29.31, p < .001, the opposite pattern emerged for negative traits: pretending 
to have negative Warmth-related traits was rated as being more difficult (M = 4.03) than 
pretending to have negative Competence-related traits (M = 3.33), F(1, 42) = 6.16, p = .017. 
As predicted, the difference between positive and negative traits was only reliable among 
Competence-related traits, F(1, 40) = 62.94, p < .001.   
Difficulty Hiding. The ANOVA yielded a main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 108.43, p 
< .001. Negative traits were rated as more difficult to hide (M = 6.13, SD = 1.09) than were 
positive traits (M = 4.39, SD = .88). This result was further qualified by a significant 
interaction between valence and content, F(1, 90) = 27.75, p < .001. Hiding negative 
Competence-related traits was rated as more difficult (M = 6.88) than hiding negative 
Warmth-related traits (M = 5.60), F(1, 42) = 21.99, p < .001. In addition, positive Warmth-
                                                      The Disconfirmability of Warmth and Competence   
       - 28 -
related traits were rated as being more difficult to hide (M = 4.68) than were positive 
Competence-related traits (M = 4.07), F(1, 48) = 6.71, p = .013. The difference between 
positive and negative traits was, as predicted, significant for Competence-related traits, F(1, 
40) = 146.32, p < .001. It was also, unexpectedly, significant for Warmth, F(1, 50) = 12.51, p 
= .001. Overall, these findings indicate that, as expected, positive and negative Competence-
related traits differed in terms of controllability, such that it is difficult to pretend to be 
competent but easy to hide, while it is easy to pretend to be incompetent, but difficult to hide.  
Diagnosticity. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of trait content, F(1, 90) 
= 9.54, p = .003: Trait-inconsistent behaviours were rated as more likely for Competence-
related traits (M = 4.86, SD = .75) than for Warmth-related traits (M = 4.34, SD = .74). 
However, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between valence and content, 
F(1, 90) = 15.08, p < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that trait-inconsistent behaviours were 
rated as significantly more likely for positive Competence-related traits (M = 5.16) than for 
positive Warmth-related traits (M = 3.91), F(1, 48) = 41.98, p < .001. However, the 
difference between negative Competence-related traits (M = 4.46) and negative Warmth-
related traits (M = 4.76) only approached statistical significance, F(1, 42) = 2.78, p = .103. 
Moreover, consistent with Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) hierarchically restrictive schema, 
inconsistent behaviours were rated significantly more likely for negative than for positive 
Warmth-related traits, F(1, 50) = 25.86, p < .001, whereas the opposite was found for 
Competence-related traits, F(1, 40) = 10.79, p = .002.  
Potential Harm. We obtained main effects of valence, F(1,90) = 243.36, p < .001, and 
trait content, F(1,90) = 49.54, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction between valence 
and content, F(1,90) = 37.64, p < .001. Because the potential harm dimension was highly 
correlated with favourability, we repeated the analysis with trait favourability as a covariate. 
The obtained effects remained significant in the ANCOVA, F(1, 89) = 14.50, p < .001, F(1, 
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89) = 42.36, p < .001, and F(1, 89) = 12.84, p < .001, respectively. As expected, incorrectly 
ascribing positive traits was rated as more harmful (M = 6.46, SD = 1.24) than incorrectly 
ascribing negative traits (M = 4.20, SD = .53). The difference between positive and negative 
traits was significant for both Warmth, F(1, 50) = 353.30.80, p < .001, and Competence, F(1, 
40) = 30.76, p < .001. Moreover, incorrectly ascribing Warmth-related traits was rated as 
more harmful (M = 5.81, SD = 1.68) than incorrectly ascribing Competence-related traits (M 
= 4.90, SD = 1.03). However, this difference was only significant for positive traits: 
incorrectly ascribing positive Warmth-related traits was rated as more harmful (M = 7.37) 
than incorrectly ascribing positive Competence-related traits (M = 5.48), F(1, 48) = 69.44, p 
< .001. This difference remained significant when differences in trait favourability were 
controlled for, F(1, 47) = 21.10, p < .001. There was no significant difference between 
negative Warmth-related (M = 4.25) and negative Competence-related traits (M = 4.12), F(1, 
42) < 1, on this dimension. Overall, these results confirm the hypotheses that the incorrect 
ascription of positive traits can potentially be more harmful than the incorrect ascription of 
negative traits, and that this difference is more pronounced for Warmth than for Competence, 
consistent with Peeters and Czapinski’s (1990) behavioural-adaptive model.  
Self-desirability. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 
1660.36, p < .001, such that, unsurprisingly, scoring high on positive traits compared to 
others was rated as more desirable (M = 7.15, SD = .55) than scoring high on negative traits 
(M = 1.97, SD = .70). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
valence and content, F(1, 90) = 8.27, p = .005. Positive Warmth-related traits were rated as 
more desirable (M = 7.34) than positive Competence-related traits (M = 6.95), F(1, 48) = 
6.57, p = .014, but the difference between Warmth and Competence in the rated desirability 
of negative traits (M = 1.83 and M = 2.17, respectively) only approached statistical 
significance, F(1, 42) = 2.70, p = .108. When overall trait favourability was controlled for, 
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the valence x content interaction remained significant, F(1, 89) = 26.45, p < .001. However, 
Warmth-Competence differences reversed. Post-hoc tests controlling for favourability 
revealed that positive Competence-related traits were more, although only marginally 
significantly, desirable for oneself (adjusted M = 7.32) than positive Warmth-related traits 
(adjusted M = 7.00), F(1, 47) = 3.49, p = .068, and that negative Competence-related traits 
were less desirable for oneself (adjusted M = 1.22) than negative Warmth-related traits 
(adjusted M = 2.48), F(1, 41) = 24.11, p < .001. These findings support the hypothesis that 
Competence is more important for the self than is Warmth (Wojciszke et al., 1998b).  
Intercorrelations of Dimensions 
 Next, we examined intercorrelations of these dimensions as well as their correlations 
with the instances dimensions assessed in Study 2. They are presented in Table 7. Since some 
of the dimensions were highly correlated with trait favourability, we also present partial 
correlations. Table 8 presents correlations calculated separately for Warmth and Competence. 
Not all significant correlations are discussed here. Rather, we will address a number of 
specific questions. First, we examined whether controllability aspects are related to the 
perceived likelihood of inconsistent behaviours (diagnosticity) for Competence, but not for 
Warmth (see Reeder, 1993). Overall, the controllability dimensions were negatively 
correlated with each other (r = -.47). Traits that were difficult to pretend to have were also 
easy to hide and vice versa. This correlation, however, was only significant for Competence 
(r = -.72) and significantly reduced for Warmth (r = -.05), z = -4.00, p < .001. As expected, 
and consistent with Reeder (1993), controllability aspects were only related to diagnosticity 
in the Competence domain. Traits that are difficult to pretend to have were also more likely 
to be associated with frequent inconsistent behaviours (r = .34). Moreover, the results suggest 
that traits that are difficult to hide are less likely to be associated with inconsistent behaviours 
(r = -.52). There were no significant correlations between the controllability dimensions and 
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the likelihood of inconsistent behaviours for Warmth and the differences between Warmth 
and Competence were significant, z = 2.40, p = .016 and z = -3.39, p = .001, respectively.  
The likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviours was significantly correlated with the 
instances dimensions. As expected, the more likely trait-inconsistent behaviours, the more 
inconsistent behavioural instances were required to disconfirm the trait (r = .46). However, 
this correlation differed significantly between Warmth and Competence, z = 4.94, p < .001. 
Whereas the likelihood of inconsistent behaviours was strongly and significantly correlated 
with instances disconfirming for Warmth (r = .73), there was no significant correlation 
between these two dimensions for Competence (r = -.13). These results did not change when 
favourability was partialled out. The likelihood of inconsistent behaviours was also 
significantly negatively correlated with instances confirming (r = -.31), suggesting that for 
traits for which inconsistent behaviour occurs often, fewer confirming behavioural instances 
are required to instantiate the trait. This relationship does not follow logically, but was 
expected due to the asymmetrical relationship between the instances dimensions and the 
hierarchically-structured nature of trait-behaviour implications in both the Warmth and 
Competence domains. This correlation was moderated by content, z = -6.17, p < .001: Only 
for Warmth did this dimension correlate negatively with instances confirming (r = -.74). 
There was a positive correlation between the likelihood of inconsistent behaviours and 
instances confirming for Competence (r = .36), which, however, disappeared when 
favourability was partialled out (partial r = -.08).  
The potential harm of incorrect trait ascriptions was highly correlated with a number 
of dimensions due to its high correlation with overall trait favourability. As can be seen in 
Table 8, even after the overall trait favourability was partialled out, the potential harm of 
incorrect trait ascriptions was positively correlated with instances confirming (partial r = .24) 
and negatively with instances disconfirming (partial r = -.49), suggesting that the more 
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harmful the potential consequences of an incorrect ascription are, the more conservatively the 
trait is ascribed and the more easily it is disconfirmed. These correlations were moderated by 
content. The correlation between potential harm and instances confirming was significant for 
Warmth (partial r = .49), but not for Competence (partial r = .28), t(89) = -2.04, p = .045, 
consistent with Peeters and Czapinski’s (1990) suggestion that the motive to avoid harm may 
play a greater role in ascriptions of Warmth. However, the correlation between potential harm 
and instances disconfirming was significant for both Warmth (partial r = -.34) and 
Competence (partial r = -.48), and stronger for Competence, t(89) = 2.57, p = .011.  
A trait’s desirability for the self was also highly correlated with many dimensions due 
to its high correlation with favourability. Thus, we will again discuss only partial correlations. 
There was no significant partial correlation of self-desirability with instances confirming 
overall (r = -.07), however, a significant positive correlation emerged for Competence (partial 
r = .32), but not for Warmth (partial r = -.10). This result suggests that the more desirable a 
trait is for oneself, the more instances are required to confirm the trait for other people, but 
only if the trait pertains to Competence. Nonetheless, the difference between Warmth and 
Competence was not significant, t(89) < 1. There was also no significant overall correlation 
between self-desirability and instances disconfirming. The correlations between self-
desirability and instances disconfirming differed significantly for Warmth and Competence, 
t(89) = 2.87, p = .005, such that the negative correlation was stronger for Competence (partial 
r = -.26) than for Warmth (partial r = -.02), but neither was significant. These results provide 
only limited evidence for the prediction that self-serving biases may play a greater role for 
the ascription of Competence than Warmth. Overall, however, the present findings are 
consistent with the idea that motivational goals can lead to the enhanced weighing of negative 
information (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). As both the self-protection from harm and self-
enhancement dimensions were correlated with the instances dimensions, but uncorrelated 
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with each other when favourability was partialled out, we can conclude that both motives 
may bias trait ascriptions.  
General Discussion 
This research extended Rothbart and Park’s (1986) classic work on the (dis-) confirmability 
of trait concepts by addressing the moderating role of trait content (Warmth vs. Competence), 
and by scaling traits on additional dimensions to gain further insights into the different factors 
underlying trait (dis-) confirmability. We will now discuss the theoretical contributions of 
this work, specifically relating to the role of trait content and the determinants of trait (dis-) 
confirmability, and the practical implications of these findings.   
Theoretical Contributions and Directions for Future Research 
Does Content Matter? 
The results obtained in Study 2 suggest that content does matter. The strong negativity 
bias reported by Rothbart and Park (1986) was replicated for traits related to Warmth, but 
was greatly reduced for traits related to Competence, a finding that was only in part due to 
differences in overall favourability between the two content categories. Whereas positive 
traits in the Warmth and Competence domains were rated to require about equal amounts of 
confirming evidence to be established, negative traits in the Warmth domain seem to be 
inferred more easily than negative traits in the Competence domain. Moreover, positive 
Competence-related traits were judged to require more trait-inconsistent behavioural 
instances to be disconfirmed than positive Warmth-related traits, and negative Competence-
related traits were judged to require fewer instances to be disconfirmed than negative 
Warmth-related traits. Also, the positive correlation between trait favourability and the 
instances confirming dimension and the negative correlation between trait favourability and 
instances disconfirming, which where highly significant for Warmth, were significantly 
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reduced among Competence-related traits. Although these results imply that trait 
favourability is a less important predictor of trait (dis-) confirmability for Competence than 
for Warmth, they are not consistent with a positivity effect. Rather, the findings of Study 2 
are consistent with a reduced negativity effect or null effect in the Competence domain. As 
discussed earlier, these findings may be due to a number of methodological differences 
between the present study and prior research on trait ascriptions (e.g., Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987).  
However, further insights into the effects of trait content on trait (dis-) confirmability 
may be gained when the present results are examined from the perspective of the Five-Factor 
Model (FFM) of personality. Using a lexical approach to identify the domains that are most 
important in describing the self and others, a series of studies have emphasized Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Intellect/Openness as five broad 
domains of personality (see Goldberg, 1993). An inspection of the present trait list using a 
classification of traits according to the FFM (Goldberg, 1982) revealed that our Warmth 
category broadly overlaps with Agreeableness, and that most of our Competence-related traits 
relate to Conscientiousness, and some to Intellect/Openness. We examined these three types 
of trait content in terms of their (dis-)confirmability in an exploratory analysis. The nature of 
the analyses goes beyond the scope of the current paper; however, it should be noted that a 
strong negativity effect emerged for Agreeableness (N = 42, r = .88, p <.001, for instances 
confirming, and r = -.90, p <.001, for instances disconfirming), a reduced negativity effect 
emerged for Conscientiousness (N = 25, r = .70, p <.001, for instances confirming, and r = -
.64, p =.007, for instances disconfirming), and there was a null effect (N = 9, r = .34, n.s., for 
instances confirming) and a marginally significant positivity effect (r = -.64, p =.064, for 
instances disconfirming) for the Intellect/Openness category. These findings are only 
exploratory and should be replicated in future research using a larger number of 
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representative traits for each content category. However, these results strongly suggest that 
future research on the effect of trait content on trait (dis-) confirmability may benefit from 
further breaking down the Competence category into Conscientiousness and 
Intellect/Openness, which seem to have different patterns of trait (dis-) confirmability. 
Future work could also investigate the (dis-) confirmability of Extraversion and 
Emotional Instability. According to Reeder (1993), Extraversion has an ability component 
and it is thus possible that a positivity effect would emerge (i.e., extraverted behaviours are 
seen as informative and lead to correspondent inferences). However, because most social 
situations demand extraverted behaviour, introverted behaviour might be seen as highly 
informative and therefore lead to a negativity bias (Jones & Davis, 1965). For Neuroticism, 
which is the domain that is most closely associated with social desirability (see Funder & 
Dobroth, 1987), a negativity bias is likely to emerge. Identifying biases in the ascription of 
these different types of traits could have important implications for the diagnosis of 
personality disorders.  
Furthermore, Coker, Samuel, and Widiger (2002) showed that the high poles of these 
five personality domains contain some socially undesirable and probably maladaptive traits 
(e.g., ‘ingratiating’ at the high pole of Agreeableness and ‘overbookish’ at the high pole of 
Conscientiousness) and that low poles contain some socially desirable traits. This suggests 
that Warmth and Competence may not be perfectly correlated with social desirability and that 
both content and social desirability could be systematically varied in future studies on trait 
ascription. This would, for example, allow researchers to disentangle the independent effects 
of behaviour diagnosticity (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) and social desirability (Jones 
& Davis, 1965) at the trait level. 
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Determinants of Trait (Dis-) Confirmability 
 Rothbart and Park (1986) examined personality traits along relevant dimensions 
which determine a trait’s potential (dis-)confirmability; these were related to the observability 
of trait-related behaviour, the link between observed behaviour and inferred disposition, and 
the structure of the social environment. One factor, operationalized as the imaginability of 
trait-related behaviour, represents the extent to which trait-related behaviour is observable 
and likely to be recognized as such. It is determined by specific characteristics of a trait, such 
as its abstractness or level of generality, and whether it implies clear behavioural referents or 
whether behavioural exemplars are accessible in memory. In the present research this factor 
was associated with the frequency with which trait words are used in language. The second 
factor associated with characteristics of the trait is that of how confirming and disconfirming 
behaviours (once observed) are used to make trait judgements, i.e., the dimensions assessing 
the number of behavioural instances required to confirm or disconfirm a trait. Although this 
factor is likely to be, in part, determined by the schematic representation of trait-behaviour 
implications (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979), it is also dependent on the characteristics of the 
social environment and the goals of the perceiver.  
 The frequency of a trait in the general population and the frequency of social 
occasions allowing trait-related behaviours represent the environmental factor; this factor is 
related to the possibility of observing trait-related behaviour in everyday social situations. 
One major determinant of this factor is that of social desirability: socially desirable behaviour 
is performed frequently (because it is rewarded) and socially undesirable behaviour is 
performed infrequently (because it is punished). This has implications for trait ascriptions. 
Behaviour which violates social norms is particularly informative about some underlying 
stable quality of the actor and will thus lead to dispositional attributions, while socially 
desirable behaviour, which is likely to be performed irrespective of whether an actor 
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possesses the corresponding trait, is less informative (Jones & Davis, 1965). Consistent with 
these ideas, trait favourability emerged as a strong predictor of instances confirming and 
disconfirming in both Rothbart and Park’s (1986) and the present research.  
  The present work further extended Rothbart and Park’s (1986) analysis by showing 
that how behavioural information is used is not just determined by the social desirability of a 
trait, but also by the perceived behavioural range of the trait-possessor and the motivational 
goals of the perceiver. Three dimensions – the difficulty in pretending and hiding a trait and 
the likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviours – assessed the behavioural range of the trait-
possessor (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979) and are related to the diagnosticity of trait-related 
behaviour (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). In line with Reeder and Brewer (1979), the 
likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviour was perceived to be greater for traits related to 
negative Warmth compared to positive Warmth, and for traits related to positive Competence 
compared to negative Competence. Consistent with Reeder’s (1993) ideas, this indicator of 
behavioural range was predicted by the controllability of confirming and disconfirming 
behaviours, i.e., the extent to which a trait can be hidden or ‘faked’, in the Competence but 
not in the Warmth domain. It was also correlated with instances confirming and 
disconfirming, suggesting that the perceived behavioural range of the trait possessor has 
some impact on trait ascriptions. 
 There was also evidence from the present research that motivational goals of the 
perceiver, specifically self-protection from harm and self-enhancement, may lead to increased 
weighting of negative behavioural information in trait ascription. In line with Peeters and 
Czapinski’s (1990) behavioural adaptive approach, the potential harm dimension correlated 
positively with the number of behavioural instances required to confirm a trait and negatively 
with the number of behavioural instances required to disconfirm a trait. This indicates that the 
harm that can result from incorrect trait ascriptions may bias people’s decision criteria for 
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ascribing traits to others (see also Kahnemann & Tversky, 1984). Also, a trait’s desirability 
for the self was found to correlate positively with instances confirming and negatively with 
instances disconfirming, but only among Competence-related traits. These results suggest that 
self-serving motivations may bias trait inferences in the Competence but not the Warmth 
domain. In sum, the current analysis suggests that the ease with which a trait is (dis-) 
confirmed is determined by at least three types of variables: specific characteristics of the 
trait that characterize its link to discrete concepts, conditions that characterize the social 
environment, and characteristics of the social perceiver making the inferences. This analysis 
could be further extended in future work by investigating variables that characterize the target 
individual about whom inferences are to be made, such as the target’s group membership, 
status, and relationship to the perceiver, all of which are likely to moderate the effects of the 
dimensions explored here and elsewhere. Thus, a complete model of trait (dis-)confirmability 
needs to delineate the factors that are most appropriate for describing the links between trait, 
environment, target, and perceiver.  
Nonetheless, some of the present findings need to be further consolidated by 
experimental research examining trait inferences under more naturalistic circumstances for 
two main reasons. First, the current results are only correlational and can therefore not imply 
causality. Second, Rothbart and Park’s (1986) methodology assesses general beliefs about 
attributes of traits, not actual trait attributions on the basis of observed behaviour (but see 
Funder & Dobroth, 1987, on the significant relationship between these trait attributes and 
accuracy in personality judgment). This methodology also does not permit controlling for 
behaviour extremity, an important factor that moderates the extent to which negativity and 
positivity effects are shown (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), or to address motivational 
factors more directly. We thus suggest that future research simultaneously manipulates 
factors that affect behaviour diagnosticity (e.g., situational demands, behaviour extremity) 
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and motivational forces (e.g., personal involvement, threat manipulations to increase the 
motivation to avoid potentially costly trait ascriptions) under more naturalistic circumstances. 
This would allow researchers to assess the unique contributions of both the diagnosticity 
(Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) and behavioural-adaptive (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990) perspectives on trait attribution.  
Implications of the Present Findings 
An interesting implication of these findings concerns the perspective of the target 
individuals to whom these traits are ascribed. That negative traits are assigned relatively 
easily, are lost or revised with some difficulty, are difficult to hide, and are assigned with 
little expectation that such an assignment will produce negative consequences, helps to 
explain why so much energy is invested in managing the impressions that other people have 
of us. The long term risks of being assigned a negative trait, or set of traits, are potentially 
very high. Research on the negative effects of stigma (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 
1991) and of prejudice from the target’s perspective (e.g., Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & 
Stangor, 2003) readily attests to this. Furthermore, these risks are likely to be exacerbated for 
members of cohesive social networks, or high entitativity groups, wherein behavioural norms 
are more strongly enforced.  
For interventions aimed at improving negative perceptions of out-groups, such as 
intergroup contact, the present model and findings imply that contact is likely to have more of 
an effect on certain kinds of stereotypical traits and beliefs, and less of an effect on others.  
Further compounding this analysis is the finding that high and low prejudiced individuals 
employ different attributional processes in behaviour-trait inferences, resulting in greater 
stereotype resistance among the highly prejudiced (see Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & 
Azam, 2005). The present findings also suggest that that the (dis-)confirmability of traits may 
be further biased by the presence of motivational goals such as avoiding harm and obtaining 
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positive self-views, both of which may also be influential in intergroup situations where 
protecting the in-group from harmful outsiders (see Brewer, 2001) as well as attaining 
positive distinctiveness in comparison to other groups (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) are 
important goals. Future attempts to understand the trait-inference process in intergroup 
relations should therefore incorporate both the content of the stereotypes as well as the nature 
of the perceiver (viz., prejudice level, motivational goals) into the model.  
Conclusions 
The present research extends previous work on the (dis-)confirmability of trait 
concepts by examining the moderating effect of trait content (Warmth vs. Competence), and 
by scaling traits on a number of attributes that provide insights into the different processes 
that may underlie trait ascriptions. The present results indicate that Warmth and Competence 
show different patterns of (dis-) confirmability. This research also provided preliminary 
evidence that a number of different factors, related to attributes of the trait, the environment, 
and the perceiver, may simultaneously determine trait ascriptions. By considering the various 
determinants of trait (dis-)confirmability in chorus, and by distinguishing different types of 
trait content, we may arrive at a more complete understanding of the trait inference process.   
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Table 1. Number of Judges and Coefficient Alpha Values Before and After Deletion of 
Unreliable Judges (Study 2) 
 
Dimension 
 
Original N 
 
Original α 
value 
 
Final N 
 
Final α 
value 
 
Favourability 
 
10 
 
.98 
 
10 
 
.98 
Instances Confirming 10 .87 10 .87 
Instances Disconfirming 11 .80 10 .84 
Imaginability Confirming 10 .69 10 .69 
Imaginability Disconfirming 10 .66 10 .66 
Occasions Confirming 10 .83 10 .83 
Occasions Disconfirming 9 .65 8 .68 
Population Frequency 10 .74 10 .74 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Trait Ratings on 8 Dimensions as a Function of 
Trait Content and Valence (Study 2) 
 
 
Trait Content 
 
 
Warmth 
 
Competence 
 
Dimension 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Favourability 
 
7.66 (.58) 
 
2.02 (.49) 
 
6.65 (.35) 
 
3.93 (.67) 
Instances Confirming 5.78 (1.00) 2.87 (.73) 5.29 (.62) 4.08 (.65) 
Instances Disconfirming 3.87 (.84) 6.11 (.70) 5.12 (.66) 5.41 (.74) 
Imaginability Confirming 5.72 (1.16) 6.13 (1.25) 6.10 (.92) 5.85 (1.00) 
Imaginability Disconfirming 6.26 (.98) 6.01 (.94) 6.12 (.85) 6.61 (.68) 
Occasions Confirming 5.89 (1.20) 5.75 (1.22) 5.58 (.91) 5.64 (.80) 
Occasions Disconfirming 5.50 (1.02) 5.79 (.89) 5.31 (.70) 5.49 (.58) 
Population Frequency 5.69 (.67) 4.71 (.76) 5.28 (.66) 4.57 (.77) 
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Table 3. Zero-order Intercorrelations of Dimensions and Correlations with Favourability Partialled Out across Traits (N = 94) (Study 2) 
 
 
Dimensions 
 
Instances 
Confirming 
 
Instances 
Disconfirming 
 
Imagine 
Confirming 
 
Imagine 
Disconfirming 
 
Occasions 
Confirming 
 
Occasions 
Disconfirming 
 
Population 
Frequency 
 
Word  
Frequency 
 
Favourability 
 
.84*** 
 
-.69*** 
 
-.05 
 
.05 
 
.06 
 
-.15 
 
.55*** 
 
.07 
Instances Confirming - -.69*** -.28* -.08 -.11 -.27** .42*** .02 
Partial favourability - -.30** -.45*** -.23* -.30** -.26* -.10 -.07 
Instances Disconfirming  - .26* -.12 -.05 .03 -.34** -.05 
Partial favourability 
  
.31** -.11 -.01 -.11 .06 .01 
Imaginability Confirming   - .47*** .44*** .41*** .17 .29** 
Partial favourability 
   
.48*** .44*** .41*** .23* .30** 
Imaginability Disconfirming     - .53*** .54*** .20+ .19+ 
Partial favourability 
    
.53*** .55*** .20+ .18+ 
Occasions Confirming     - .62*** .52*** .20+ 
Partial favourability 
     
.64*** .58*** .20+ 
Occasions Disconfirming       - .15 .17 
Partial favourability 
      
.29** .18+ 
Population Frequency       - .19+ 
Partial favourability 
       
.18+ 
Note. + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 4. Intercorrelations of Favourability, Instances Confirming, and Instances 
Disconfirming and Partial Correlations, calculated separately for Warmth (N = 52) and 
Competence (N = 42) (Study 2) 
 
 
Dimension 
 
Instances  
Confirming 
 
Instances 
Disconfirming 
 
Favourability 
  
Warmth .88*** -.84*** 
Competence .65*** -.12 
Instances Confirming   
Warmth - -.84*** 
Competence - -.17 
Instances Confirming 
(partial favourability) 
  
Warmth - -.42** 
Competence - -.12 
       Note. ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 5. Number of Judges and Coefficient Alpha Values Before and After Deletion of 
Unreliable Judges (Study 3) 
 
Dimension 
 
Original N 
 
Original α 
value 
 
Final N 
 
Final α value 
 
Difficulty Pretending 
 
10 
 
.77 
 
10 
 
.77 
Difficulty Hiding 10 .71 9 .79 
Diagnosticity 12 .61 11 .62 
Potential Harm 11 .83 10 .89 
Self-desirability 10 .98 10 .98 
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Trait Ratings on Additional Dimensions as a 
Function of Trait Content and Trait Valence (Study 3) 
  
Trait Content 
  
Warmth 
 
Competence 
 
Dimension 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Difficulty Pretending 
 
4.18 (.84) 
 
4.03 (1.00) 
 
5.59 (.99) 
 
3.33 (.78) 
Difficulty  Hiding 4.68 (.89) 5.60 (.99) 4.07 (.76) 6.88 (.73) 
Likelihood of Inconsistent 
Behaviour (Diagnosticity) 
 
3.91 (.67) 
 
4.76 (.63) 
 
5.16 (.69) 
 
4.46 (.66) 
 
Potential Harm 
 
7.37 (.75) 
 
4.25 (.39) 
 
5.48 (.85) 
 
4.12 (.69) 
 
Self-desirability 
 
7.34 (.50) 
 
1.83 (.79) 
 
6.95 (.55) 
 
2.17 (.49) 
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Table 7. Zero-order Intercorrelations of Additional Dimensions and Correlations with Favourability, Instances Confirming, and Instances 
Disconfirming, and Correlations with Favourability Partialled Out across Traits (N = 94) (Study 3) 
 
Dimensions 
 
Difficulty Hiding 
 
Diagnosticity 
 
Potential Harm 
 
Self-desirability 
 
Favourability 
 
Instances 
Confirming 
 
Instances 
Disconfirming 
 
1. Difficulty Pretending 
 
-.47*** 
 
.18+ 
 
.20+ 
 
.41*** 
 
.30** 
 
.29** 
 
.04 
Partial favourability -.39*** .25* -.05 .43*** - .07 .30** 
2. Difficulty Hiding - -.19+ -.45*** -.62*** -.48*** -.36*** .22* 
Partial favourability 
 
-.33** -.13 -.61*** - .10 -.17 
3. Diagnosticity  - -.40*** -.10 -.19+ -.31** .46*** 
Partial favourability 
  
-.41*** .30** - -.28** .46*** 
4. Potential Harm   - .76*** .77*** .73*** -.75*** 
Partial favourability 
   
.14 - .24* -.49*** 
5. Self-Desirability    - .95*** .79*** -.63*** 
Partial favourability 
    - -.07 .13 
Note. + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 8. Intercorrelations of Additional Dimension, Favourability, Instances Confirming, and Instances Disconfirming, and Correlations with 
Favourability partialled out, calculated separately for Warmth (N = 52) and Competence (N = 42) (Study 3) 
 
 
Zero-order Correlations 
 
Partial Correlations 
 
Dimensions 
 
Hide 
 
Diagno 
 
Harm 
 
Self 
 
Favour 
 
InstCon 
 
InstDis 
 
Hide 
 
Diagno 
 
Harm 
 
Self 
 
InstCon 
 
InstDis 
Difficulty Pretending              
Warmth -.05 -.16 .18 .02 .04 .22 -.02 -.04 -.17 .38** -.13 .39** .02 
Competence -.72*** .34* .48** .80*** .78*** .43** -.03 -.15 -.09 .03 .24 -.16 .10 
Difficulty Hiding              
Warmth - .15 -.42** -.39** -.39** -.35* .29* - -.12 -.15 .03 .00 -.08 
Competence - -.52*** -.61*** -.91*** -.87*** -.56*** .20 - -.22 -.22 -.54*** -.00 .19 
Diagnosticity              
Warmth  - -.66*** -.59*** -.58*** -.74*** .73***  - -.42** -.15 -.59*** .55*** 
Competence  - .29+ .54*** .50*** .36* -.13  - -.02 .27+ .06 -.08 
Potential Harm          - .09 .49*** -.34* 
Warmth   - .92*** .92*** .90*** -.84***   - .19 .28 -.48** 
Competence   - .62*** .60*** .56*** -.45**       
Self-Desirability              
Warmth    - .99*** .86*** -.82***    - -.10 -.02 
Competence    - .97*** .68*** -.18    - .32* -.26 
Note. + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Hide = difficulty with which someone can hide having this trait; Diagn = likelihood of inconsistent behaviours (diagnosticity); Self = desirability 
of trait for oneself; Favour=Favourability; InstCo=Instances Confirming; InstDis=Instances Disconfirming. 
